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A TALE OF TWO DICTA: THE NON-RESTRICTED
STOCK OPTION
RICHARD J. HORWICH*
ABOUT THE VIEWPOINT OF THE AUTHOR
Capital gains are taxed less than ordinary income,' and the greater
part of the tax law concerning stock options flows from that simple proposi-
tion. Congress has seen fit to assure capital gains treatment for certain
"restricted" stock options granted to employees; 2 the richly-deserved
criticism of that legislation will be left to others4--our concern is with
those whom Congress has not seen fit to bless.
It is the position of this author that the courts and administrative
officials should not permit capital gains treatment to the optionee, or to
his transferees at less than arm's length, until the non-restricted 4 stock
option transaction is "closed" in a comprehensive sense, i.e., until the
optionee has no further interest in the option, or the optionee has ir-
revocably made the complete investment called for by the option and
all conditions affecting value, which arise at or from the grant or exercise
of the option, have terminated. Implicit in such a proposal is the pos-
sibility of taxing each event which increases the value of the option until
the transaction is thus closed, even if the same transaction consequently
results in ordinary income to the optionee on two or more occasions.
Thereby, these gains from performing services will be taxed as ordinary
income, as are other forms of compensation for services, congressional
largesse aside; this is as it should be.
I. DEATH OF AN ANCESTOR
Once upon a time-but these words, "once upon a time," are the
very heart of our story, and we shall return to them in due course. First,
let us go back to a tax distinction of yesteryear, for today's quest to
secure capital gains treatment from stock option transactions had an
illustrious ancestor, a hardy one whose death required two decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. Since those Supreme Court decisions
also gave birth to the two dicta which people our tale, we shall not go
astray with a brief biography of that ancestor-the proprietary stock
option.
* Partner, Pallot, Marks, Lundeen, Poppell & Horwich, Miami, Florida; Teaching
Fellow, University of Miami School of Law.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-02.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421.
3. E.g., Griswold, The Mysterious Stock Option, in 2 TAx REVISIoN COMPENDIUM 1327
(1959).
4. References in the text after this point to stock options will mean non-restricted stock
options unless otherwise indicated.
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The early life of this stock option, beset by a generally unfriendly
Commissioner and Board of Tax Appeals, but protected by the federal
circuit courts, has been narrated elsewhere.' In 1938, the Board of Tax
Appeals itself recognized a distinction between an option given as com-
pensation and an option given to afford the employee a "proprietary in-
terest" in the business of the employer; it was held that the amount of
the spread6 at exercise was not automatically compensation.7 Not only
did the Commissioner acquiesce in this decision,8 but the regulations were
amended to recognize the distinction:
If property is transferred ... by an employer to an employee,
for an amount substantially less than its fair market value,
regardless of whether the transfer is in the guise of a sale or
exchange, such . . . employee shall include in gross income the
difference between the amount paid for the property and the
amount of its fair market value to the extent that such differ-
ence is in the nature of (1) compensation for services rendered
or to be rendered .... 9
Of course, a distinction implies two possibilities, and on occasion the
courts found as a matter of fact that the controlling intention was to
give additional compensation.1 ° It was the case of Commissioner v.
Smith" that first brought the distinction to the attention of its ultimate
dispatcher, the Supreme Court.
Smith received from his employer an option to acquire stock of
another corporation at the fair market value at the time of the grant. The
Tax Court applied the distinction between proprietary and compensa-
tory options and found that the option was intended as compensation;
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Reversing the Court
of Appeals and upholding the Tax Court, the Supreme Court found that
the intended compensation was as of the time of exercise of the option,
since there was apparently no benefit at the time of grant.
The implication was that there must be compensation at some time,
and the Commissioner seized the opportunity to let the proprietary stock
option have "both barrels." The regulations quoted above were amended
significantly: "[t]he difference between the amount paid for the prop-
erty and the amount of its fair market value is in the nature of compensa-
5. See generally Leake & Gleeson, The Unrestricted Stock Option, in TAXATION OF DE-
FERRED EMPLOYEE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 621, 623-24 (Sellin ed. 1960).
6. The difference between the option price and the market value.
7. Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
8. 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 13.
9. T.D. 4879, 1939-1 Ctrm. BULL. 159, as incorporated in Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-i
(1943). (Emphasis added.)
10. E.g., Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943) (grant of
options accompanied by reduction of salaries).
11. 324 U.S. 177, rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 695 (1945).
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tion and shall be included in the gross income of the employee .... ))12 A
simultaneous ruling on employee stock options announced that all such
options were taxable on the spread when exercised or transferred.' 3
At least one court recognized that the proprietary stock option was
a condemned distinction. 4 Other decisions, however, breathed life into
the champion of capital gains.'" Again, the victories were Pyrrhic, leading
only to the Supreme Court and the final denouement there, in Commis-
sioner v. LoBue.1
LoBue received from his employer a non-transferable option to buy
stock at five dollars per share; it was worth more when he exercised it
and his employer deducted the spread at the time of exercise. However,
the Tax Court found a proprietary option not taxable to the employee
at exercise, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. In
reversing, the Supreme Court pronounced the distinction between pro-
prietary and compensatory stock options dead for lack of statutory sup-
port.' Neither legal technicality 8 nor equitable plea 19 has been sufficient
to revive the ghost.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TIMES
Having buried the proprietary stock option, we turn again to the
classical opening words of the storyteller, "once upon a time." These




12. T.D. 5507, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 18. (Emphasis added.) The regulations as amended,
subsequently became Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-I(c) (1953).
13. I.T. 3795, 1946-1 CnM. BULL. 15. Both regulations and the ruling were made ap-
plicable to options granted on or after February 26, 1945, the date of the Smith decision.
Options granted earlier were excluded by the ruling if the spread at grant was "substantial"
(a term further defined in the ruling) or if the grant was clearly income under prior regula-
tions, and the employee and employer promptly consented to limit the employee's basis to
the amount paid for the stock and to forego any deduction by the employer. There was
some doubt that requiring consent was within the power of the Commissioner. Malcolm S.
Clark, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 719 (1950) (dictum).
14. Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948).
15. Commissioner v. Straus, 208 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953); Robert A. Bowen, 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 668 (1954); Malcolm S. Clark, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 719 (1950).
16. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
17. The statute interpreted by the Court, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 9,
included in gross income "gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever."
The Court, noting that the definition is broad, found no applicable exemption, "gifts" being
the only exemption conceivably relevant. There appears to be no reason to draw a different
conclusion from the present statute, which includes in gross income "all income from what-
ever source derived." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
18. E.g., Robert C. Enos, 31 T.C. 100 (1958) (compensation to employee upon cancella-
tion effected by repurchase from employee and related transferee).
19. E.g., William S. Thornhill, 37 T.C. 988 (1962) (compensation to original owner-
employees upon exercise of option granted to 'permit acquisition of control after repayment
of investors).
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we analyze at a stroke the current quest for capital gains via stock
options." For if the transactions involving the transfer of stock to the
employee can be taxable as compensation only once, and if the time of
taxability can be controlled by the taxpayer, the stock option remains a
vehicle for tax avoidance by capital gains treatment.
Our story is not concerned with the avoidance by an employee whose
employer deducted the spread at time of exercise and is now apparently
protected by the statute of limitations2' or by a change in the applicable
law.22 Nor do we bother with taxpayers who have successfully claimed
taxability in an earlier year in which they did not report the compensa-
tion.23 Rather, presuming proper application of the law, we will describe
and evaluate the history of the law determining the time of taxing the
compensation element; as we will see, the extent of the compensation
element has generally been dependent on the timing.
III. Smith--THE FIRST DICTUM
Even before the Smith decision24 cast a funereal pallor over the
visage of the proprietary stock option, the issue of timing the taxability
of any compensation element had reared its elusive head. The Commis-
sioner had long and steadfastly taxed as compensation the spread at
time of exercise, if any. 5 Courts which found proprietary stock options
20. There was some concern that § 53, Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat.
1644, was intended to reject out of hand capital gains treatment of the disposition of an
option by adding § 1234(c) to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, reading in part as follows
(§ 1234 generally accords options the same treatment as the property to which they relate):
(c) Non-Application of Section.-This section shall not apply to . . . (2) in
the case of gain attributable to the sale or exchange of a privilege or option, any
income derived in connection with such privilege or option which, without regard
to this section, is treated as other than gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset.
Helping to engender the concern was the general explanation in a committee report: "As a
result, the section will not apply to gain from the sale of an employee stock option which
is in the nature of compensation to the employee." S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong. (1958)
(comment on § 57 of H.R. 8381).
However, the technical explanation in the same report is less alarming:
Under this exception, for example, to the extent that gain on the sale or exchange
of an option to purchase stock is in the nature of compensation to an employee,
such gain is not to be treated as capital gain merely because the stock, if acquired,
would be a capital asset in his hands. (Emphasis added.)
The regulations apparently concede that the law otherwise in effect has remained unchanged:
Section 1234 does not apply to gain resulting from the sale or exchange of an
option . . . . To the extent that the gain is in the nature of compensation (see
sections 61 and 421, and the regulations thereunder, relating to employee stock
options). Treas. Reg. § 1.1234-1(e)(1) (1959).
21. E.g., Robert A. Bowen, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 668 (1954).
22. E.g., Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. United States, 296 F.2d 221 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
23. E.g., Colton v. Williams, 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (option taxable at
grant) ; Commissioner v. Estate of Ogsbury, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958) (option exercised
on giving prepayable note) ; cf. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956) (remanded to
determine whether or not option was exercised upon giving note).
24. Note 11 supra.
25. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 249 & n.9 (1956).
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tended to tax any compensation element at the time of grant to the
extent of the spread at that time;26 but a compensatory stock option was
taxed as the Commissioner had proposed.2" In a rising stock market, the
effects of such timing and of the proprietary distinction were parallel and
not always clearly separated.
But the separate factor of timing drew new strength from the set-
backs dealt proprietary stock options by Smith and by the Commissioner's
rulings following Smith. True, Congress reacted to afford some protection
for capital gains treatment of employee stock options,28 but this was
limited to certain "restricted" non-transferable options granted to em-
ployees at a price of at least eighty-five per cent of market value at the
time of the grant and with no deduction for the employer. 9 Those who
could not work within these limitations, those who still attributed validity
to the "proprietary" distinction, and those who were saddled with existing
options (or the stock or proceeds thereof) continued to litigate.
Commissioner v. Smith has been described earlier; so much for its
holding. Today, however, it looms larger for one dictum: "It of course
does not follow that in other circumstances not here present the option
itself, rather than the proceeds of its exercise, could not be found to be
the only intended compensation."" ° It will be recalled from the facts of
the Smith case that the option price was equal to the market value at the
time of grant; also, as reflected in the opinion denying rehearing,8' it
appears that the stock could not be delivered until certain indebtedness of
the issuing corporation to third parties was paid. There was room to infer
that a freely exercisable option, with a spread at grant, would have been
taxed as compensation at grant, and at grant only.
Faced with the loss of the proprietary stock option, taxpayers found
much solace in the dictum and, for a while, some help. Even a court ap-
plying Smith broadly to wipe out proprietary stock options paid enough
deference to the dictum only to find it inapplicable . 2 Then, in McNamara
v. Commissioner,"3 the court limited compensation to the spread at grant
26. Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935); cf. Merhengood
Corp. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 714 (1937) (presumption
of no income at grant from failure to report on return) ; Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92
F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937) (option price approximately equal to value at grant).
27. Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943).
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 130A, as added by Revenue Act of 1950, § 218(a), 64 Stat.
942 (now INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 421).
29. Ibid. The 1954 provision allows a variable price, within somewhat complex limits.
See generally Schlesinger, Selected Problems in the Use of Restricted Stock Options, 36 TAXES
709 (1958).
Another limitation prohibits any substantial restriction on the ownership of stock trans-
ferred to an employee. Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-467, 1954-2 Cur. BULL. 207.
30. 324 U.S. 177, 182 (1945).
31. 324 U.S. 695.
32. Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948).
33. 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
[VOL. XVIII
NON-RESTRICTED STOCK OPTION
of an assignable option priced below market; the Smith dictum was
relied on squarely. In Commissioner v. Stone's Estate,84 the court gave
the taxpayer capital gains treatment on the appreciation from the time
of the grant to the sale of warrants by finding compensation at the grant
of transferable warrants priced a little above market; the Smith dictum
again was relied upon squarely." In both cases, the employer deducted
and the employee reported as income the value, as they saw it, of the
rights at the time of grant; this was no doubt of special importance in
Stone's Estate, since there was no spread at the time of grant on which to
base value. Thus, although Smith was a victory for the Commissioner,
an imposing body of law favoring the taxpayer was built upon the dictum
in Smith; but it was only the first dictum of our tale.
IV. LoBue-THE SECOND DICTUM
LoBue36 represented another big victory for the Commissioner in
the stock option area. Proprietary stock options were no more. Taxation
as ordinary income of the spread at the time of exercise was upheld, at
least in the case at bar.8" But in the midst of ordinary income, we find
capital gain possibilities, by virtue of this dictum:
It is of course possible for the recipient of a stock option to
realize an immediate taxable gain. See Commissioner v. Smith,
324 U.S. 177, 181-182. The option might have a readily as-
certainable market value and the recipient might be free to sell
his option. But this is not such a case. These three options were
not transferable' [8. Cf. McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d
505.] and LoBue's right to buy stock under them was contingent
upon his remaining an employee of the company until they were
exercised.
8
While the last sentence of text quoted is not part of the dictum, it
is included to show the puzzling citation of McNamara; that case did not
limit taxability at grant to options having "a readily ascertainable market
value." Neither did Smith, cited in the LoBue dictum; and the Smith
dictum apparently cited refers to the possibility of compensation taxable
at the grant being the only compensation.
Two justices dissenting 9 in LoBue argued that the taxable event
was the grant with respect to two of the options which the dissent under-
34. 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954).
35. Nevertheless, the Court of Claims recently characterized Stone as a decision based
upon principles rejected by the Supreme Court in LoBue. Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v.
United States, 296 F.2d 221 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (granting Stone's employer a deduction for the
appreciation from grant to sale).
36. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
37. However, the case was remanded to determine when the option was exercised in light
of the fact that a note was given sometime before the transfer of the stock.
38. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 249 (1956).
39. Id. at 250.
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stood to be unconditional.40 The taxation at grant was said to prevent a
division of the total profit between ordinary income and capital gain
"dependent solely upon the fortuitous circumstances of when the em-
ployee exercises his option."'" This example was given:
Suppose two employees are given unconditional options to buy
stock at $5, the current market value. The first exercises the
option immediately and sells the stock a year later at $15. The
second holds the option a year, exercises it, and sells the stock
immediately at $15. Admittedly the $10 gain would be taxed to
the first as capital gain; under the Court's view, it would be taxed
to the second as ordinary income because it is "compensation"
for services. I fail to see how the gain can be any more "com-
pensation" to one than it is to the other.
The contention and the example failed to note an important distinction-
the second employee did not make his commitment until the stock reached
fifteen dollars.43
Such law as was initially created on the basis of the LoBue dictum
was mostly non-judicial. However, in one case taxing the exercise of an
unassignable stock option, although delivery of the stock was delayed
until it was paid for, the court likened the right to secure the delivery
of the stock to the receipt of an assignable stock option, terming each
the "unrestricted use of a valuable economic right. '4 4 More predictably,
it was held that an option requiring six months' employment before ex-
ercise had no ascertainable value at grant.
4
Meanwhile, in November of 1956, the Commissioner proposed regu-
lations which made no provision for options taxable as compensation
at grant.46 After more than two years and some changes in other respects,
these became final regulations. 47 However, since then, possibly in response
to vigorous criticism, 48 the regulations were amended to provide that an
employee has compensation at grant if the option has "a readily ascertain-
able market value. '4 We recognize, of course, that the phrase quoted is
from the LoBue dictum, and it is about this phrase that the battle pres-
ently rages.
The regulations purport to describe "readily ascertainable market
value." Ordinarily, there shall be none "unless the option is actively traded
40. Id. at 252.
41. Id. at 251.
42. Id. at 251-52, n.2.
43. See Grisswold, supra note 3, at 1330-31.
44. Commissioner v. Estate of Ogsbury, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958).
45. Robert C. Enos, 31 T.C. 100 (1958).
46. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6, 21 Fed. Reg. 8774.
47. T.D. 6416, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 126.
48. E.g., Leake & Gleeson, op. cit. supra note 5, at 635-36.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1961), as amended, T.D. 6540, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 161.
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on an established market."50 If the option is not so traded, the taxpayer
must show that the option is freely transferable, exercisable immediately
in full, free of restrictions having a significant effect on its value (other
than liens or conditions to secure its price 1) and accurately valued.52
Accurate valuation requires ascertaining the value of the property op-
tioned, the length of the period the option is in force, and the probability
of increase or decrease in the value of the property."5
Time factors enter into the valuation "irrespective of whether there
is a right to make an immediate bargain purchase of the property."54
This is explained as follows:
The option privilege is the opportunity to benefit at any time
during the period the option may be exercised from any ap-
preciation during such period in the value of the property sub-
ject to the option without risking any capital. Therefore, the
fair market value of an option is not merely the difference
which may exist at a particular time between the option price
and the value of the property subject to the option but also
includes the value of the option privilege. 55
It has been urged that the regulations are invalid in requiring that
the non-traded option be exercisable immediately in order for there to be
compensation at grant.56 Perhaps this requirement was designed to dis-
courage employers by facing them with the prospect of immediate dilu-
tion of stock at a price somewhere below market while having no hold
on the employee (and, in many cases, the immediate cost of at least a
simplified registration under the Securities Act of 1933); however, the
regulations quoted above indicate that a spread at grant is not necessary
to valuation at grant and the cases bear this out. 7 Often, the employer
can risk immediate exercise if the option price is at or above market
value at the time of the grant.
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (2) (1961).
51. Presumably any restrictions dischargeable at will by the transferee are also irrelevant.
See Commissioner v. Estate of Ogsbury, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (1961).
53. Ibid.
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (3) (ii) (1961).
55. Ibid.
56. Lefevre, Nonrestricted Stock Options, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 353, 364
(1962); Zarky, The Tax Incidents of Non-Restricted Stock Options, U. So. CAL. 1962 TAX
INST. 625, 632-33.
57. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954) (warrants at price over
market held to have value at grant) ; Colton v. Williams, 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1961)
(value includes "lead" value of option). Contra, Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. United
States, 296 F.2d 221 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (testimony on value insufficient in face of market value
below option price) ; see Willie L. McNatt, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 600 (1962), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Frank v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1963) (lack of value in-
dicated by contemporaneous sales below option price). See also Fleischer & Meyer, Tax
Treatment of Securities Compensation: Problem of Underwriters, 16 TAX L. REv. 119, 145
n.133 (1960).
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Since the promulgation of the regulations based on the LoBue
dictum, some cases have continued to turn on market value,58 but two
relevant decisions have been handed down." They both deal with proof
of value of the option at grant; they seem to apply different tests, as
well as reaching different results. The opinions are extensive and some
discussion of each is warranted, at least until the passage of time rele-
gates them to historical importance.
First was Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. United States,6" a
1961 Court of Claims decision. Earlier we discussed Commissioner v.
Stone's Estate,61 in which the court found compensation at the time of the
grant and capital gains on the appreciation thereafter. In Union Chem.,
the issue was whether or not Stone's employer was entitled to a deduc-
tion at the time Stone sold the warrants based on their value then. Recog-
nizing that the rule in Stone's Estate would require disallowance of the
deduction, the Court of Claims reasoned that LoBue had changed the
law and established a new test-"readily ascertainable market value."
Furthermore, the new test was strictly applied. Direct testimony of ex-
perts as to the approximate value of the warrants at grant was held to
prove only that the warrants were valuable but not that they had readily
ascertainable market value; the deduction was allowed as of the sale of
the warrants. Such technical strictness was bound to incur criticism; 62
but, although the regulations were not mentioned, their tough require-
ments gained strong support.63
In 1962, a federal district court in Ohio decided the second case,
Colton v. Williams. 4 After finding that the option itself was intended as
compensation, and citing McNamara"' as authority for rejecting a theory
of estoppel based on the failure to report compensation in the year of
grant,66 the court moved to the question of value-"present value." A
recent public offering had sold at three dollars per share while the option
price was three dollars and twenty-five cents; but the court noted that
the offering was oversubscribed and chose to believe testimony that the
58. E.g., Champion v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1962) (remanded to deter-
mine fair market value applying blockage rule); Elsie L. Dees, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 915,
928 (1962) (Issue 2).
59. Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. United States, 296 F.2d 221 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ; Colton
v. Williams, 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
60. Union Chem. & Materials Corp. v. United States, supra note 59.
61. 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954).
62. Comment, Taxation of the Stock Option as Intended Compensation, 9 U.C.L.A. L.
Rav. 703, 716-18 (1962). The commentator found the decision "irreconcilable" with LoBue
since the warrants were freely transferable and their value was "calculated." Id. at 717. Of
course, as this entire tale is designed to emphasize, the conflict, if any, is with the LoBue
dictum, not with its holding.
63. Tyre, Non-restricted Stock Option "Loophole" Spotlighted by Recent Decision, 16
J. TAXATION 272 (1962).
64. 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
65. Commissioner v. McNamara, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
66. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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actual value at grant, two months after the offering, was three dollars
and seventy-five cents and that the value of the option privilege itself,
the "lead," was an additional fifty cents. In passing, the court disap-
proved of the arbitrary effect of limiting the value to the spread, if any,
at the time of grant." Smith was cited,68 but not LoBue; but it is really
the LoBue dictum that was given its most recent judicial treatment in
the following passage discussing the regulations (quoted at length because
of its current interest):
Moreover, Treasury Regulation § 1.421-6(c)(3)(ii) provides
that the fair market value of an option includes the value at-
tributable to the option privilege irrespective of whether there is
a right to make an immediate bargain purchase. We are not
presently concerned with whether this provision dispenses with
the present value theory (supra). We cite the section to support
our finding that the option at the time of its granting had a
value per share of $1.00, which includes the factor of per-
centage "lead."
The Government repeatedly calls our attention to this Treasury
Regulation, and insists that the option has no value includible
in income for the year of 1951 because it does not have a readily
ascertainable fair market value. It is quite true as the plaintiff
contends that the Regulation does not find specific support in
the case law in all its particularities, but we do not find it neces-
sary to express a disinclination to follow the Regulation. The
option under consideration appears to conform to a reasonable
interpretation of the conditions imposed by the Regulation.
First, we note that there is no requirement that the stock be
actively traded on an established market, indicating, it would
seem, that the benefits of the section are not to be limited to the
larger corporations. Under Section 1.421-6(c)(3)(i), the sole
requirement is that the option have a readily ascertainable fair
market value, which means that it can be measured with reason-
able accuracy. Now, unless the previous dispensation that the
stock need not be actively traded on an exchange means nothing,
there would appear to be no other reliable means of proof except
the sort of testimony heard in this trial. We have the objective
fact that the taxpayer was to receive this option "in lieu of all
present incentive payments." In addition, there was the evi-
dence of the successful public offering. Finally, there was the
expert testimony of an informed broker. More evidence would
border on being merely cumulative, especially when any evi-
dence against the fact of the option having a value was absent.
Therefore, consequent to our finding that the option had value
67. Colton v. Williams, 209 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1961) (dictum).
68. Ibid.
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and was income in the year of 1951, we find that Regulation
1.421-6 supports the position of the plaintiff taxpayer.69
V. A SHORT INTERLUDE ABOUT Two HOLDINGS
Now we digress from the apparent mainstream of our story to a
matter which, to this author, seems completely bound up with the same
quest for capital gains treatment. This is the matter of restricted stock,
i.e., stock subject to restrictions affecting its transfer or the realization of
its value.
It was early held that restrictions on the stock acquired would re-
duce its value, and therefore, the compensation at acquisition of the
shares.7° Aside from compensation, there are a number of cases that have
decided whether or not particular restrictions prevented determination
of fair market value.7' In the field of compensatory stock options, how-
ever, two cases stand out.
72
In Robert Lehman,78 the taxpayer and the Commissioner agreed
that the restrictions on the shares acquired by the taxpayer prevented
the ascertainment of fair market value. The Commissioner sought to tax
as ordinary income the spread between cost and market value when the
restrictions lapsed. The Tax Court squarely rejected that proposal with
this comment:
[The Commissioner] cites a number of cases holding that no
income is realized when the shares are received subject to re-
strictions which preclude ascertainment of fair market value but
none holding that compensation is received or a taxable event
69. Id. at 382. The unreported conclusions of law of the district court indicate that the
four requirements of the regulations (transferability, immediate full availability, lack of
significant restrictions and readily ascertainable value) were considered fulfilled. Alfred,
Current Problem Areas in Income Taxation, 14 W. REs. L. REV. 217, 227 n.54 (1963).
70. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1936), affirming, 76 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1935).
Some of the shares acquired at $100 per share, a price far below their value, were subject to
an option of the employer to repurchase at the same low price. Both courts used strong
language with respect to the valuation of these shares:
Until the option expired in subsequent years, the market value of the shares
subject to it could scarcely exceed the price at which the company could repur-
chase them .... 76 F.2d at 114.
Considering the option to repurchase at par, outstanding in 1922, there could be no
proper finding of fair market value at that time in excess of $100 per share. 297
U.S. at 109.
71. See generally Kempler, Non-Restricted Stock Option Plans: Kuchman and Lehman
Cases, 16 TAx L. REv. 339, 341 (1961). For two recent cases on restricted securities, see Arc
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1961) (Issue 1) (securities valued despite
restrictions) and Mailloux v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1963) (valuation of
speculative stock required to reflect restriction).
72. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952); Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951). A
third case, MacDonald v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1956), suggests two types
of restrictions: an understanding that retention of stock is required to retain one's job, and
a liability under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to return to the corporation any profits
on sale of the stock.
73. 17 T.C. 652 (1951).
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takes place when the restrictions terminate and fair market
value can be determined.74
In Harold H. Kuchman,75 the taxpayer was an executive and stock-
holder who received the right to buy shares at five dollars each with the
restrictions that he could not sell for one year and, that if his employment
terminated within one year, the seller (the underwriter) could re-
purchase at five dollars per share. The Commissioner contended that the
taxpayer was taxable upon exercise of the right, but the Tax Court, four
judges dissenting, held there was no ascertainable fair market value at
acquisition of the stock and there could be no income on the receipt of
stock costing five dollars per share if the only possible sale was at five
dollars per share. The Commissioner acquiesced.76
When the Commissioner issued the previously mentioned regulations
in 1959, 77 he adopted the Kuchman case with these special features:
(a) Exercise of the option would not be the taxable event, if
the "property is subject to a restriction which has a significant
effect on its value"; the taxable event would be the earlier of the




(b) The amount of compensation in case (a) would be the lesser
of the spread at the time of the taxable event or the spread at
the time of acquisition of the property (valuing the property
without regard to the restriction) .
7
The first feature is an expansion of Kuchman, deferring taxation if the
restriction merely has a "significant effect on value"; apparently the
Commissioner is resigned to having only one bite at the ordinary-income
apple and does not want to eat while there is a big restriction running
through the fruit."' The second feature is probably a response to the
concern of the Tax Court in Lehman about using fortuitously high values
upon lapse of restrictions to measure compensation; 81 since Lehman
was obviously rejected otherwise, 2 the acquiescence in that decision was
withdrawn a few months later.83
74. Id. at 654.
75. 18 T.C. 154 (1952).
76. 1952-2 CUM. BULL. 2.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1959), as added by T.D. 6416, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 126.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (2) (i) (1959), now Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d) (2) (i) (1961).
79. Ibid.
80. But cf. Kempler, supra note 71, at 349.
81. Lefevre, supra note 56, at 358.
82. Schlesinger, The Utility and Feasibility of Stock Options in Close Corporations, in
TAXATION OF DEFERRED EMPLOYEE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 580, 619 (Sellin ed. 1960);
Fleischer & Meyer, supra note 57, at 138-41.
83. T.I.R. 248, Aug. 29, 1960.
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VI. THE CAMP FOLLOWERS
As the quest by employees for capital gains treatment of stock op-
tion transactions ran into mounting difficulties, there were vigorous
proposals made to disassociate the independent contractors-primarily
the underwriters-from the employees,84 although both may receive
stock options as compensation. The treatment of the classification prob-
lem by the Commissioner has oscillated unhappily 5 over a period of a
little more than seven years.86 The Commissioner proposed to exclude
independent contractors,"7 but then included them8 and thereafter ex-
cluded them.89 Subsequently, he again proposed to include them9" but
left them excluded.' Most recently, and perhaps finally, he has included
them. 2 During periods of exclusion, the Commissioner relied on regula-
tions concerning bargain purchases under the general taxing statute
93
mixed with the possibility of future inclusion. 4 Judicial classification has
been inclusive in theory but uncertain in practice.9"
84. Brach & Dixon, Tax Treatment of Compensatory Stock Options to Non-employees;
The Valuation Problem, 17 J. TAXATION 66 (1962) ; Fleischer & Meyer supra note 57;
Webster, Compensating the Underwriter, N.Y.U. 21sT INST. ON FED. TAX. 1433 (1963).
Contra, Tyre, supra note 58; see Alexander, Current Valuation Problems, U. So. CAL. 1963
TAX INST. 685, 727.
85. See generally Brach & Dixon, supra note 84, at 66-68, 70. When announcing the
latest proposal, the Commissioner indicated that special efforts would be made to settle
pending cases because the law had been so uncertain. T.I.R. 490, July 11, 1963.
86. The first proposal, infra note 87, was November 10, 1956; the latest regulations,
infra note 92, were promulgated December 12, 1963.
87. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6, 21 Fed. Reg. 8774 (1956).
88. T.D. 6416, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 126.
89. T.D. 6481, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 159.
90. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6, 25 Fed. Reg. 12414 (1960).
91. T.D. 6540, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 161.
92. T.D. 6696, 1963 INT. Rzv. BULL. No. 52, at 9, adding Treas. Reg. § 1.61-15 (regula-
tions 1.421-6 made applicable to independent contractors). However, lenders will not be
affected pending new proposed regulations concerning their options, T.I.R. 526, Dec. 12, 1963,
an exception of increased importance because of federal legislation favoring Small Business
Investment Companies. See 20 J. TAXATION 79 (1964).
93. Rev. Rul. 2-49, 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 13, relying on Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (1957).
Predecessor regulations go far back. Brach & Dixon, supra note 84, at 66-7. The language was
essentially the same, except for the Smith changes. Note 12 supra and accompanying text.
However, the 1959 regulations on non-restricted stock options were made applicable to
bargain purchases by employees of any property subject to restrictions having a "significant
effect" on its value. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(5), added by T.D. 6416, 1959-2 Cum. BULL.
126, which also added Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1959).
94. See Tyre, supra note 63, at 274; Lefevre, supra note 56, at 370.
95. In Victorson v. Commissioner, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 425 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1964),
the appellate court noted the employee regulation deferring taxation when a restriction
has a significant effect on value, but held it inapplicable to years before issuance of the
regulation; nevertheless, the court noted that new regulations, only thirty-five days old on
the date of the opinion, extended the rule to underwriters. 13 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 427, n.2.
Judge Raum, in the Tax Court, had expressly indicated that employee rules should apply.
31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1370, 1378 n.1 (1962). In Willie L. McNatt, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
600 (1962), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Frank v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 143 (8th Cir.
1963), the court apparently used employee rules since it cited LoBue and Union Chem.
employee cases. But, in fact, Victorson merely determines fair market value despite restric-
tions depressing value, and McNatt measures compensation at exercise and finds none in the
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Those who advocate early valuation of rights and stock acquired by
non-employees have offered much of value with respect to the desira-
bility 6 and practicality97 of valuing option rights and even, in many
cases, restricted stock. This might be a somewhat biased approach de-
signed to limit the amount of ordinary income and maximize the portion
of total profit to receive capital gains treatment; the proponents stand
firmly behind the regulations limiting the compensation on restricted
stock to no more than the spread at acquisition (disregarding the restric-
tions).*8 On the other hand, the last-mentioned limitation is ingeniously
justified by distinguishing the underwriter from the employee because
the underwriter has completed the performance of his services by the
time he acquires the stock whereas the employee is expected to continue
performing services.99 The allowance of the distinction is probably a
matter of policy, but it would seem that the realities of underwriting often
continue to require services of at least an informal nature for many years,
particularly in the case of the typical small company forced to cough up
stock options in order to interest underwriters.0 °
VII. EPILOGUE FOR THE PRACTICAL
Two main areas of capital gains possibilities remain: compensation
only at grant, and restricted stock. For the publicly held corporation,
with stock having provable market value, the certainty of capital gains
treatment under the statutory scheme1 °' probably overrides the possibility
of a deduction for the employer and any other advantages of a non-
restricted stock option arrangement. 0 2
absence of a spread, without discussion of restrictions or pure option value. It is interesting
to note that the taxpayer lost both cases: Victorson wanted to defer compensation and
McNatt lost capital gains treatment on an alternativ6 theory. Yet the Commissioner has
cited these two cases, plus Smith and LoBue, as authority that the employee rules extend
to independent contractors. T.I.R. 490, July 11, 1963.
96. Fleischer & Meyer, supra note 57, at 144-45; Webster, supra note 84, at 1446-48.
97. Brach & Dixon, supra note 84, at 72-3.
98. Brach & Dixon, supra note 84, at 73-4; Fleischer & Meyer, supra note 57, at 138-41.
A limit on compensation may not assure capital gains treatment of further profits. In
Walter F. Tellier, P-H TAX CT. REP. & ME-m. DEC. (P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 1 63,212 (Aug. 14,
1963), the court ruled that the warrants and stock held by the taxpayer were inventory rather
than investment property. Therefore, the court did not reach the alternative government
argument that the gains represented compensation for underwriting services. The taxpayer
curiously and unsuccessfully argued that securities received as compensation could not be
part of inventory at the time of resale.
99. Brach & Dixon, supra note 84, at 73-74; Fleischer & Meyer, supra note 57, at 138-41;
Webster, supra note 84, at 1447.
100. Cf. Alexander, supra note 84, at 717. See discussion on "Non-cash Compensation"
in SEC, Special Studies of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. ch.
IV (1963) (greater frequency in "best-efforts" underwritings and tendency to appear where
rate of cash compensation is highest).
101. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421.
102. But cf. Leake & Gleeson, The Unrestricted Stock Option, in TAXATION OF DEFERRED
EMPLOYEE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 621, at 622-23 (Sellin ed. 1960). As of this writing,
some limitations on the use and benefits of § 421 appear to be in the offing. H.R. 8363, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 222 (1964).
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For the closely held corporation, however, the picture is different.
Restricted stock option benefits are relatively unavailable because the
stock cannot be valued with sufficient assurance to know whether or not
the statutory requirements are being met.' It has been suggested that
the valuation problem and another problem important to a close corpo-
ration, dilution of control, can be avoided by optioning stock restricted by
the reservation to the employer of a right of first refusal at book value;
under present law, any increase in book value after exercise would re-
ceive capital gains treatment. 104 Unfortunately this seems best adapted
to young or dormant corporations for which the proportionate growth
of equity may be expected to be large; in other situations there ap-
parently would be a dilemma between (1) a substantial commitment at
exercise compared to potential capital gains, or (2) a very low option
price, reducing the commitment, but increasing the ordinary income ele-
ment. Of course, the "book value" restriction will serve to defer taxation
until sale of the stock, 10 but this could be achieved more easily by the
use of "shadow stock." 0
Another suggestion is that the taxpayer rely on the tale of two
dicta.' 0 7 For the publicly held corporation, as stated before, this would
be risking uncertainty principally to secure the deduction for the em-
ployer; in fact, the very possibility of such a deduction tends to make
arrangements relying on the dicta too good to be true-better than Con-
gress's own gift to the executive. 0 On the other hand, the close corpora-
tion, largely unable to use the statute, faces the total inability to value its
options, let alone the Commissioner's requirement that the option be
capable of precise valuation.
It is a third class of corporation, still unheralded in the law, for
whom the tale of two dicta seems to hold potential: the semi-close (or
semi-public) corporation, an initially closely held corporation which has
sold stock to the public but in which the original principals retain a
large stock interest, normally effective control. To prevent further dilu-
tion of control, and yet compete for executives, 0 9 the controlling stock-
103. Schlesinger, supra note 82, at 600-11. However, proposed legislation would limit
the penalty, if market value is underestimated in good faith, to the inclusion in ordinary
income of the lesser of one and one-half times the deficiency or the spread at exercise. S. REP.
No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1964).
104. Schlesinger, supra note 82, at 612-19; cf. Willis, Non-Restricted Stock Options, 101
TRUSTS & ESTATES 1146, 1205 (1962).
105. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (2) (ii), example (4) (1961).
106. See generally Lentz, Different Kinds of Stock Bonus Plans in TAXATION OF DE-
FERRED EMPLOYEE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 34, 46-52 (Sellin ed. 1960) ; Note, Phantom
Stock Plans, 76 HARV. L. REV. 619 (1963).
107. Leake & GIeeson, supra note 102.
108. Comment, Taxation of the Stock Option as Intended Compensation, 9 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 703, 710-13 (1962).
109. And directors. See Moore, Stock Options for Directors in Small Corporations, 11
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 396 (1962).
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holders may offer, or have the corporation offer, options on stock which,
once acquired, can only be retained while the employment continues."'
This will secure for the executive the capital gains afforded by the "book
value" restriction discussed above but without the early investment, pro-
vided that the current and unresolved conflict between Union Chem. and
the regulations, on the one hand, and Colton v. Williams, on the other, is
resolved by taxing the approximate value of the option as the only com-
pensation.
VIII. EPILOGUE FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL
Suppose that the dictum in Smith merely said "the option itself...
found to be intended compensation" rather than, "the option itself ...
found to be the only intended compensation."'
Suppose that options were valued at grant if at all possible and that
the value was taxed at that time as compensation." 2
Suppose that additional value received upon exercise of the option
(or other bargain purchase of shares), or upon disposition of the option,
were also taxed as compensation, 1 ' unless restrictions on acquired stock
totally prevented valuation." 4
Suppose that Lehman were overruled and that the additional value
added upon the termination of any restrictions (or upon the earlier dis-
position of the stock) were also taxed as compensation."'
110. Schlesinger, supra note 82, at 612.
111. (Emphasis added.) Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (4) (discount on employer's
note to be reported as payments collected), with Leake & Gleeson, supra note 102, at 634-37.
112. Authorities cited notes 96 and 97 supra. See generally Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2
Cum. BULL. 15, 16:
The amount of the fair market value of property is a question of fact, but only in
rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market
value . . . .Whether value is ascertainable is a reviewable question of law.
The ruling includes many citations and examples, but none in the stock option area.
The Supreme Court, too, has recently indicated the desirability of current valuation,
even if rough, in a marital settlement case. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72-73 (1962).
However, it has been suggested that the Court was "influenced by the correlative problem
of the wife's basis . . . ." Alexander, supra note 84, at 688.
113. Cf. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 249 (1956):
Moreover, the uniform Treasury practice since 1923 has been to measure the
compensation to employees given stock options subject to contingencies of this sort
by the difference between the option price and the market value of the shares at the
time the option is exercised. We relied in part upon this practice in Commissioner
v. Smith . . . . And in its 1950 Act affording limited tax benefits for "restricted
stock option plans" Congress adopted the same kind of standard for measurement
of gains. . . .Under these circumstances there is no reason for departing from the
Treasury practice.
114. See Kempler, supra note 71, at 349.
115. See Alexander, supra note 84, at 731-32; Fleischer & Meyer, Tax Treatment of
Securities Compensation: Problem of Underwriters, 16 TAX L. REv. 119, 135-37. It has been
suggested that Commissioner v. Estate of Ogsbury, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958) weakens
Lehman considerably. Fleischer & Meyer, supra at 136; Leake & Gleeson, supra note 93, at
644.
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What problems would arise?
The first is the practical problem of many valuations." 6 A compari-
son of English and American law on stock options led one writer to con-
clude that economic gain should be taxed as and when it can be adminis-
tratively valued."' Tending to suggest that valuation is a burdensome
administrative task is a recent adherence by the Treasury to its policy of
not issuing advance rulings as to valuation." 8 However, it would seem
to result in more uniform taxation to move the area of dispute from
whether or not valuation is proper to the actual valuation itself."9
The second problem involves the appreciation of stock acquired
subject to restrictions. Aside from the claim of the underwriters, alluded
to earlier, that they are finished performing their services when they
acquire the stock, there is the general question of whether or not ap-
preciation after investment should be taxed as ordinary income. 20 As
was noted in VII, the investment commitment is a practical bar to capital
gains in many cases. Yet, have we not returned again to the problem of
taxing compensation at the time and to the extent generally intended-to
Smith, once removed? Instead of letting an optionee play with a stock
option, doing nothing until the market rises, he now gets restricted stock.
Tax is deferred until the restrictions lapse; if the market has not risen,
his ordinary income will be limited to the value of his bargain purchase
(and ordinary income will be reduced if the market falls before lapse' 2 ').
But if the market goes up, shall ordinary income still be so limited
and the balance of profit receive capital gains treatment? As in Smith
and LoBue, the usual intent is to compensate for services with the ap-
preciation, documentary mumbo-jumbo notwithstanding; it is like a cash
bonus promised as a "return on investment" if the stock goes up.'22 The
restrictions are generally created at the time of, and in connection with,
the grant of options or bargain sale of stock as payment for services;
certainly the lapse of the restrictions is contemplated then, and the har-
vest at the time of the lapse should relate back to the payment for ser-
vices and be taxed as ordinary income.
116. For a chart of the present steps in recognizing income on non-restricted stock op-
tions, see Robertson, Stock Options and Bargain Purchases Should be Reviewed in Present
Market Picture, 19 J. TAXATON 88, 91 (1963).
117. Mullock, Unconditional Nonqualijled Stock Options, 40 TAXES 860 (1962).
118. Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 CtrUx. BULL. 527. But cf. note 112 supra.
119. Consider the quotation from Revenue Ruling 58-402 at note 112 supra.
120. It has been pointed out that this problem concerned the Tax Court in Lehman and
the Treasury in writing the regulations. Note 81 supra and accompanying text.
121. Zarky, The Tax Incidents of Non-Restricted Stock Options, U. So. CAL. 1962 TAX
INST. 625, 641.
122. Cf. William J. Haag, 40 T.C. 88 (June 4, 1963) ; appeal docketed, 8th Cir., Sept. 3,
1963. In the Haag case, a controlling shareholder, who had been leasing property to the
corporation, sold it to the corporation with an option to repurchase at far less than the value
(because the corporation improved the property). Upon repurchase, he again leased the prop-
erty to the corporation. The court treated the spread on exercise of the option as additional
rent to the shareholder.
